Economic crises and government policy
Defence date: 20 November 2015 ; Examining Board: Professor Russell Cooper, Penn State University, Supervisor; Professor Elena Carletti, EUI & Bocconi University; Professor Yan Bai, University of Rochester; Professor Alexander Guembel, Toulouse School of Economics ; This thesis consists of two chapters exploring how even benevolent governments may struggle to convince their citizens that they will stick to the policies that ensure the best outcomes in equilibrium. If people believe that the government will optimally choose a different policy in the event of a crisis, their reaction to that belief may in fact bring about just such a crisis. This thesis investigates the circumstances in which these kinds of commitment problems can be overcome. The first chapter is on bank resolution, where the choice between resolving insolvent banks and bailing them out creates a time inconsistency problem. To deter banks from taking excessive risks, governments want to convince them that they will choose resolution. However, when facing the costs of liquidating banks, governments may be tempted to bail them out instead. By strengthening their bank resolution regimes, governments reduce these costs, thus credibly committing themselves to choosing resolution over bailouts. Governments with greater resources face a more severe commitment problem. When banks interact strategically, improving the resolution regime can eliminate equilibria in which they coordinate on risky investment strategies. In the second chapter, Antoine Camous and I present a theory linking the cyclicality of fiscal policy to inherited public debt. When debt is low, fiscal policy is countercyclical, in the sense that the government responds to reductions in output by cutting the tax rate. Above a threshold level of debt, however, optimal fiscal policy becomes procyclical. This creates the possibility of self-fulfilling crises, in which output is low because workers expect high taxes, and the government sets high taxes because output is low. Our model suggests why highly indebted governments might implement procyclical fiscal policy during recessions, even without facing high sovereign risk premia.
